Gradual Network Expansion and Universal Service Obligations by Gautier, Axel & Mizuno, Keizo
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 82:2 2011 pp. 97–113




HEC, University of Lie`ge, Belgium
and
Keizo MIZUNO
Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan
ABSTRACT∗∗: Universal service obligations are usually not competitively neutral
as they modify the way firms compete in the market. In this paper, we consider
a continuum of local markets in a dynamic setting with a stochastically growing
demand. The incumbent must serve all markets (ubiquity) possibly at a uniform
price and an entrant decides on its market coverage before firms compete in prices.
Connecting a market involves a sunk cost. We show that the imposition of a uniform
price constraint modifies the timing of entry: for low connection cost markets, entry
occurs earlier while for high connection cost markets, entry occurs later.
1 Introduction
Universal service obligations (USO) have long been imposed in industries
like telecommunication, energy or postal services. Universal service obligations are
usually defined as the obligation for an operator (or a group of operators) to provide
a range of basic services of specified quality to all consumers at an affordable rate
(Cremer et al., 2001). In many instances, a uniform price is imposed as an additional
requirement to the service provider.
Universal service obligations and, in particular, the imposition of a uniform
price constraint are usually not competitively neutral. The USO modify competition
in the market in at least three different ways: (i) the entry behaviour of competing
firms (Armstrong 2001), (ii) the price game (Valletti et al. 2002; Gautier and Wauthy
2010), and (iii) the extent of market coverage by incoming firms (Valletti et al. 2002).
We briefly sketch these three points.
The uniform price makes the urban (or low cost) sub-markets artificially
profitable and this may attract inefficient competitors i.e. firms that would not be
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able to challenge the incumbent in the absence of the universal service obligations.
Conversely, rural (or high cost) sub-markets are artificially unprofitable and this may
deter the entry of efficient competitors. Prices that are not cost-reflective may thus
generate inefficient entry.
Concerning point (ii), suppose that the incumbent firm must offer a service
nationwide at the same price while the competitors can compete on part of the
territory (usually in the most profitable urban regions). There are de facto two types
of local sub-markets: those covered by the competitors and those still monopolized by
the incumbent, for instance because entry is prohibitively costly. The uniform price
creates a strategic link between these two types of markets. For the incumbent,
challenging the entrants in the contested markets by decreasing its price has an
opportunity cost because the same price discount must be offered to consumers in
the sub-markets that the incumbent still monopolizes. This strategic link makes the
incumbent softer in the price game. As a result, prices in contested markets are
higher under uniform pricing.
(iii) stems from the result of (ii). If they face a less aggressive incumbent, com-
petitors are able to realize higher profits and this should, in principle, stimulate mar-
ket expansion. But, if the competitors extend their market coverage, they reduce the
incumbent’s opportunity cost of decreasing its price. Thus larger market coverage by
the entrants triggers a more aggressive price behaviour by the universal service
provider. For this reason, the entrants have strategic reasons to limit their market
penetration. Combining the two effects, the market coverage by non-USO firms may
be higher or smaller when a uniform price is part of the universal service.
This paper focuses on another potential effect of the uniform price: its impact
on the timing of entry by a competing firm. Consider a continuum of local markets
in a dynamic setting where demand growth is uncertain. To supply goods or services
in any local market, the entrant must pay a sunk connection cost. Local markets
differ according to their connection cost. The USO impose that the incumbent must
serve all the local markets (ubiquity of the service) but the entrant can progressively
expand its network as the number of consumers grows. Connection costs are at least
partially sunk. With uncertain demand and partially irreversible investment decisions
(connection costs cannot be fully recovered), the firm has the opportunity to wait
for new information on the evolution of demand before entering the market. The
entrant’s problem can be formalized as a real option one (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). In
particular, the problem faced by the entrant is to decide if and when it pays the sunk
connection cost to enter any given local market. The entrant’s investment behaviour
is summarized in a threshold function that specifies, for each local market, a demand
level at which the entrant connects the local market.
We show that, for low connection cost markets, entry occurs earlier in the
uniform pricing regime than in an unconstrained pricing regime, while for high
connection cost markets, entry occurs later. That is, the path of gradual network
expansion is affected by the uniform pricing with entry occurring earlier in low cost
markets and later in high cost markets.
Gradual network expansion is often observed in network industries. In the
postal sector, alternative end-to-end operators develop their delivery network grad-
ually (see our section 2 for a detailed description). In the broadband internet market,
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Table 1 – Market coverage and market shares, 2006
CityMail CityMail Sandd SelektMail Unipost
Sweden Denmark The Netherlands The Netherlands Spain
Market coverage 40%a 40% 100% 100% 70%
Market share 8.6% n.a.b 6% 5% 3.8%
aincreased to 44% in 2007.
bstarted operations on 1 January 2007.
the most common technology is the ADSL, using the existing copper wires network.
The main competing technology uses optic fibre to transmit data at a higher speed.
Currently, FTTH networks develop gradually, first in and around the city centres
and the main business districts. Lower connection costs in the city centres due to
a higher concentration of users explain this gradual deployment of the network. In
this paper, we want to go further than that and look at factors such as the rate
of demand growth, the uncertainty surrounding demand and the pricing behaviour
of the incumbent firms to explain the rate of network expansion. We show that
these factors, together with the distribution of connection costs, influence the path
of network deployment.
2 An illustration: network expansion in the postal sector
In Europe, postal markets have been fully liberalized since 1 January 2011.
With full market opening, alternative postal operators can freely compete with
the incumbent operator for the full range of products and operations.1 In Europe,
full market opening means that rival firms have two options to compete with the
incumbent postal operator: they can buy access to the incumbent’s delivery network2
or they can install their own and provide end-to-end services to their clients.
Alternative end-to-end operators already started to compete with historical
operators on parts of the European postal market. Those competitors adopt the
business model of CityMail, a pioneering Swedish alternative postal operator. They
target non-urgent bulk mail pre-sorted by the sender. Collection and sorting costs are
therefore limited. Unlike the historical operator that must deliver mail nationwide
at least five times a week,3 alternative operators choose to deliver mails at a lower
frequency (usually two or three times a week). Moreover, they do not necessarily cover
the whole territory. These alternative operators reach the break-even point with a
limited market share (5–10%). Table 1 reports the market coverage (in percentage
1 This is in sharp contrast with the US situation where the competitors of USPS are not
allowed to perform final delivery to mailboxes, the so-called last mail delivery. Despite that,
competition in the US postal market is intense but concentrated in the upstream segments of
the market (collection, transport, sorting).
2 As in the USA and currently in the UK where competitors have not (yet) deployed a
delivery network.
3 These obligations are part of the universal service obligations. Competitors are not
subject to such obligations, though they might be asked to contribute to their financing.
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Figure 1 – Evolution of market coverage
of the addresses) and the market share (in percentage of the total addressed mail
market) of five sizable alternative end-to-end operators for the year 2006.
Interestingly, new postal operators start their operations in the most dense
regions and progressively expand their network to less dense areas, eventually ending
in nationwide coverage. Gradual network expansion seems to be a striking feature of
the development of alternative postal operators. Figure 1 illustrates that. It depicts
the evolution of coverage for two major alternative operators, CityMail and Sandd.
City Mail started operations in 1993 in the Stockholm metropolitan area. At
this time, it covered 10% of the addresses. The firm gradually expanded its network
first in and around Stockholm and later to other densely populated urban centres of
Sweden, Gothenburg and Malmo¨. Its network currently covers 44% of the addresses.
In the Netherlands, there are currently two alternative postal firms with nationwide
coverage but they operated at lower scale when they entered the market. Sandd for
example covered 45% of the addresses when it started to operate in 2001 and it took
four years to reach nationwide coverage.
New postal firms target the most profitable customers, the frequent and large
senders, and the most profitable products, the (non-urgent) bulk mails that are
prepared in numbers and possibly pre-sorted by the sender. This market represents
a significant share of the total mailing stream and the mail demand is highly
concentrated in the hands of a limited number of large senders.4 For frequent
and large senders, transit time and the operator’s reliability are, together with the
price, key elements of the mail demand. And, the operator’s reliability potentially
improves over time with the mail volume handled. Consumers may therefore switch
progressively to the new operator once it has proven its reliability.
When an operator faces a growing demand, it has reasons to develop its delivery
network gradually.5 Table 2 illustrates that for Sandd, an alternative Dutch operator
who has had nationwide coverage since 2004. The number of clients had grown
continuously over time (at a double-digit rate). The mailing volume handled has
grown too, even if the average number of mails per client has decreased. The turnover
has followed an evolution parallel to the mailing volume, which means that the
4 In a calibration exercise based on French data, Billette de Villemeur et al. (2008)
consider that roughly one fourth of the total mail demand originates from 500 firms who pre-
sort their mail and the largest 5000 firms represent half of the total mail volume.
5 For the entrant, expanding the delivery network involves a substantial amount of sunk
cost (network gridding, sorting and storage facilities and so on).
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Table 2 – Sandd, key figures 2001–08 (Source: www.sandd.nl)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Turnover (million euros) 3 6 14 32 50 68 80 80
Mailing volume (million items) 14 40 68 130 230 320 390 400
Revenue per item (eurocents) 0.21 0.15 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20
Number of clients 25 100 269 400 1000 1500 2000 2200
Coverage (in % of the addresses) 45 80 95 100 100 100 100 100
growth cannot be fully explained by price rebates. Indeed, the revenue per item
remains fairly stable over time. Thus, the increasing number of clients seems to be
the main driver of the growth in the mailing volume.
In the postal sector, competition from alternative postal firms is still at its
infancy but the stylized facts we presented suggest that (1) new firms progressively
install their delivery network and (2) mail volumes carried by new firms are growing
over time. Hence, our model of gradual network expansion with a stochastically
growing number of consumers/senders could be applied to competition in the postal
sector.
Moreover, we show in our model that the path of network expansion depends, in
addition to the cost of the network, on two factors that are currently discussed a lot
in the postal sector: the uncertainty surrounding the demand growth and the pricing
constraints included in the universal service obligations.
For a long time, mail demand has grown at the same rate as GDP but currently,
it is no longer the case. With the development of electronic communications, mail
demand has grown at a lower rate and some countries even experience a decrease
in the mail volume. Moreover, there are countries where the total mail demand
is declining but the direct mail volumes are continuing to rise (at a lower rate).
E-substitution has modified the drivers of mail demand and its future evolution is
currently viewed as highly uncertain, even in the short run. Finally note that a
declining global mail volume could be perfectly consistent with an increasing demand
faced by the entrant (see Table 2).
The universal postal service, as it is defined in the third European postal
directive (2008/6/EC), does not include a mandatory uniform tariff. Countries have
the freedom to include or not a geographically uniform tariff in their definition
of the universal service. Full market opening will put pressures on the financing of
the universal service. In particular, the uniform tariff may open the door to cream-
skimming of the most profitable market segments, treat the viability of the universal
service provider and break down the universal service (Crew and Kleindorfer 2005).
Relaxing the universal service constraints and, in particular, allowing the universal
service provider to apply non-uniform prices for bulk mails is sometimes advocated as
a flanking measure to maintain the universal service in a competitive environment
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2006, Gautier and Paolini 2011).
Growing uncertainty on demand and possible changes in the definition of
the universal service will have an impact on the development of alternative postal
networks and particularly on the rate at which they will be deployed. The model we
develop in the next sections illustrates the role of uncertainty and universal service
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on the gradual extension of alternative postal networks and thereby offers elements
to evaluate the future evolution of end-to-end competition in postal markets.
3 The model
We consider a country with a continuum [0, x¯] of independent local markets.
Two firms potentially operate at x ∈ [0, x¯]: the incumbent and the entrant, denoted
respectively by i and e. Universal service obligations are imposed on firm i. These
obligations include the ubiquity of the service meaning that firm i must offer its
product or service in all local markets. Eventually, the USO includes a uniform pricing
requirement. Universal service constraints are not imposed on firm e who is free to
choose the local markets in which it decides to compete in.
To serve market x, firm e must incur a sunk connection cost g(x). Local markets
are ordered in such a way that g′(x) ≥ 0. Except for the connection cost, all the local
markets are identical. Thus, firm e enters in priority in the lower cost markets. Let
us denote by xe the last market covered by e. The country divides in two subsets:
contested markets [0, xe] where both firms supply their products and monopolized or
insulated markets [xe, x¯] where firm i is still a monopolist.
Our model is a continuous time model. At each time t, the entrant decides on
its market coverage xe and firms simultaneously name a price. Let us denote by Y(t)
the number of consumers in each local market at time t;6 by Qdi (pi, pe) and Q
d
e (pi, pe)
the demand at prices pi, pe addressed by each consumer to firm k=i,e in a contested
market (superscript ‘d’) and by Qm(pmi ) the demand at price p
m
i addressed to firm
i by each consumer in a monopolized market (superscript ‘m’). The two firms offer
differentiated products and the demand functions have standard properties.
The number of consumers is stochastically increasing over time and we will
consider that Y(t) evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion:
dY (t) = αY (t)dt + σY (t)dW (1)
where dW is the standard increment of a Wiener process, α > 0 is the drift parameter
and σ is the variance, our measure of the uncertainty surrounding the demand
growth. Since the realization of stochastic variable Y(t) is identical for all local
markets in this formulation, it represents a sort of macro shock in this economy.
Firm e can gradually expand its network as the number of consumers increases.
Firm e must decide if and when it pays the connection cost g(x) to serve the consumers
in the local market x.7
The production cost is identical for all local markets and, for analytical
simplicity, we assume zero marginal production cost for both firms. To summarize,
6 In our model, the number of consumers Y(t) is treated as an exogenous variable. This
treatment is justified by taking the product innovation that would appear in a market in
consideration as given, or by the natural rate of population growth.
7 Under the ubiquity requirement, firm i has connected all local markets by incurring a
sunk connection cost at the initial period.
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the profits of the firms at time t are given by:





e(t) = xeY(t)πe(pe, pi), (3)
where π i(pi, pe) ≡ piQdi (pi, pe), πmi (pmi ) ≡ pmi Qm(pmi ), and π e(pe, pi) ≡ peQde (pe, pi), each
of which represents firm k(= i, e)’s profit per consumer in the relevant market.
In addition to the ubiquity requirement, universal service obligations may
include constraints on the provider’s pricing behaviour. In particular, the regulator
may regulate the price structure by imposing a uniform pricing constraint.8 With
a uniform pricing constraint (UP), the price charged by the incumbent must be
independent of the consumer’s location (pi = pmi ).
There are thus two different pricing regimes for the incumbent: the uncon-
strained (profit-maximizing) pricing regime and the uniform pricing regime. On the
other hand, the entrant is not subject to any price regulation. We analyze the two
pricing regimes in turn.
4 Equilibrium in the unconstrained pricing regime
In this section, we derive equilibrium and the threshold function that charac-
terizes the entrant’s coverage decision in the unconstrained pricing regime.
4.1 The price game
Firms compete in prices and, at each time t, they name simultaneously a price.





This best reply function depends on the price pi charged by firm i on market x but it
is independent of both the realization of the stochastic variable Y(t) and the market
coverage xe.
When firm i is not subject to any price regulation, it will apply two prices: the
monopoly price pm∗i in the (x¯ − xe) markets that the incumbent still monopolizes and















8 If the market is not competitive enough, the regulator may also regulate the price level
and requires that the good/service shall be offered at an affordable price to consumers.
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Hence, in the contested markets, the equilibrium prices (p∗i , p
∗
e) are represented as the
solution of {p∗i = φ i(p∗e), p∗e = φ e(p∗i )}. We should note that all prices are independent
of both the realization of the stochastic variable Y(t) and the market coverage xe.
4.2 Market coverage
Let us examine the entrant’s decision on market coverage. To operate in a local
market x, firm e must incur a sunk cost g(x). Once it is connected to this market x,
it starts to collect a profit Y(t)π e(p∗e , p
∗
i ) in this market with a stochastic number of
consumers Y(t). The problem of firm e’s market coverage can thus be considered as a
real option problem (Dixit and Pyndick 1994). The entrant must choose if and when
it incurs the sunk cost and starts offering products at x. The option to delay entry in
a given market has a value only if (a) the investment cannot be fully recovered and
(b) the firm operates in an uncertain environment. Clearly, these conditions apply in
our model.
Furthermore, since local markets are ordered in such a way that g′(x)  0
and firm e can gradually expand its network as Y(t) changes, firm e’s problem is
reduced to determine the last market xe covered as Y(t) varies. Then, we can define
the equilibrium threshold function Y∗ (xe) such that once Y(t) reaches Y
∗ (xe), firm e
enters market xe at cost g(xe). In fact, the equilibrium threshold function is firm e’s
optimal investment rule.9
Using the standard procedure of a capacity expansion problem (see Appendix A),
the equilibrium threshold function Y∗ (xe) under the unconstrained price regime is
defined as follows:
Y ∗ (xe) = β
β − 1
r − α
πe(p∗i , p∗e )
g(xe), (4)
















The characteristics of the equilibrium in the unconstrained pricing regime are
summarized in a proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose the incumbent faces only the ubiquity constraint (i.e., it serves
all local markets). Under the unconstrained pricing regime, we have the following:




e are independent of both the
realization of the stochastic variable Y(t) and the entrant’s market coverage xe;
(ii) As the number of consumers Y(t) increases, the entrant’s market coverage xe
increases;
(iii) As uncertainty increases (i.e., as σ increases), the entrant’s threshold function
shifts upward.
9 See Pindyck (1988) and Chapter 11 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for the definition and
derivation of equilibrium threshold function in a gradual or incremental capacity expansion
problem.
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In the above proposition, (i) is obvious. (ii) states that the equilibrium threshold
function Y∗ (xe) is monotonically increasing in xe. This is because the sunk connection
cost g(x) is increasing in x. (iii) shows the effect of uncertainty on firm e’s market
coverage. In a more uncertain environment, firm e waits for a larger number of
consumers before entering a local market. Uncertainty thus slows down network
expansion by the entrant. The reason is that, in a more uncertain environment, the
option value to wait i.e. to delay investment, increases.
5 Equilibrium in the uniform pricing regime
As in the unconstrained pricing regime, we characterize the equilibrium in the
price game and the equilibrium threshold function for the uniform price case.
5.1 The price game
In the uniform pricing regime, the same price must prevail in the contested and
the monopolized markets. The imposition of a uniform pricing constraint creates a
strategic link between otherwise independent markets (Valletti et al. 2002): for the
incumbent, decreasing the price to challenge the entrant in the contested markets
has an opportunity cost equals to the lost profit (due to the price decrease) in the
monopolized markets.10
When firm i decides to challenge the entrant in the xe contested markets, it will
do so by charging a price φUPi (pe) defined as follows:
φUPi (pe) ≡ argmax
pi
xeY(t)πi(pi, pe) + (x¯ − xe)Y(t)πmi (pi) .
This function is decreasing in xe meaning that a larger market coverage by the
entrant triggers a more aggressive price reaction by the incumbent. On the other
hand, firm e’s profit-maximizing price in any covered market x is the same as in the
unconstrained pricing regime and given by φ e(pi). Thus, the price equilibrium PUP =
(pUP∗i , p
UP∗
e ) is formally defined as {pUP∗i = φUPi (pUP∗e ), pUP∗e = φ e(pUP∗i )}.
At this stage, three properties of the ‘market sharing’ equilibrium are worth
mentioning (Valletti et al. 2002). First, for xe ∈ (0, x¯), we have price bracketing: p∗i <
pUP∗i < p
m∗
i . That is, as long as the entrant does not cover the whole set of markets,
the price charged by firm i lies in between the duopoly price p∗i and the monopoly
price pm∗i that would be applied in the contested and the monopolized markets in the
unconstrained pricing regime. Second, firm i’s optimal uniform price is decreasing in
xe: dpUP∗i /dxe < 0. When the number of contested markets increases, firm i becomes
10 Notice that there is an alternative strategy for firm i: It can charge a price close or
equal to the monopoly price. In this case, firm i sells little or possibly nothing in the contested
markets but it collects the monopoly profit in the insulated markets. However, this cannot
be an equilibrium under a uniform pricing regime, as long as the products are sufficiently
differentiated (Gautier and Wauthy 2010). In the remainder of this paper, we will assume that
this condition is indeed satisfied and that firm i challenges the entrant in the whole set of
contested markets.
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relatively more aggressive i.e. its best reply correspondence shifts downward when
the entrant’s market coverage expands. Third, because of strategic complementarity,
firm e’s price is also decreasing in xe: dpUP∗e /dxe < 0 but it remains above the price p
∗
e
as long as the entrant does not have full coverage.
As a final remark in our discussion of the price game, we mention the
following properties on firm e’s equilibrium profit per consumer under the uniform
pricing regime, π e(pUP∗e , p
UP∗
i ): (i) The uniform price constraint increases its profit per
consumer in each covered market π e(p∗e , p
∗




i ) but (ii) expanding its
network decreases the profit per consumer in the uniform pricing regime: dπ e(pUP∗e ,
pUP∗i )/dxe < 0 (Valletti et al. 2002). For notational simplicity, we hereafter denote firm
e’s profit per consumer at equilibrium prices by πUP∗e (xe).
5.2 Market coverage
The derivation of firm e’s threshold function is similar to the previous case and




[πUP∗e (xe) + xe dπUP∗e /dxe]
g(xe), (6)
with β given by (5). As in the unconstrained pricing regime, we summarize some of
the properties of the equilibrium in a proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose the incumbent faces not only the ubiquity constraint but also
the uniform pricing constraint. Then, we have the following:
(i) When xe ∈ (0, x¯), equilibrium prices are higher in the contested markets: p∗k <
pUP
∗
k , k = i, e and lower in the monopolized markets: pUP∗i < pm∗i ;




e ) are independent of the realization of the
stochastic variable Y(t), they decrease as the entrant’s coverage xe expands;
(iii) As the number of consumers Y(t) increases, the entrant’s market coverage xe
expands;
(iv) As uncertainty increases (i.e., as σ increases), the entrant’s threshold function
shifts upward.
The properties of (i) and a part of (ii) are already found in Valletti et al. (2002).
(iii) and (iv) are the same qualitative characteristics as in the unconstrained pricing
regime. Firm e has an incentive to expand its network as the number of consumers
increases. However, the degree of network expansion can be different in the two
pricing regimes. We examine this point in the next section.
6 Comparisons
As mentioned, the entrant’s network expands as the number of consumers
increases in the two pricing regimes i.e., the threshold functions Y∗ (xe) and YUP
∗ (xe)
are both increasing in xe. The following proposition compares the two threshold
functions.
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Figure 2 – Evolution of market coverage
Proposition 3 Suppose (xe) ≡ πUP∗e (xe) + xedπUP∗e /dxe is a decreasing function of
xe. Then, there exists a critical value Ŷ such that xUP
∗
e ≥ (<)x∗e if and only if Y(t) ≤
(>)Ŷ.
Proof. See Appendix B
In Proposition 3, the presumption that (xe) ≡ πUP∗e (xe) + xedπUP∗e /dxe is
decreasing in xe is satisfied in many cases, including the linear demand model of
Singh and Vives (1984). According to the proposition, when Y(t) is small (large), the
entrant’s market coverage under the uniform pricing regime xUP
∗
e is larger (smaller)
than that under the unconstrained pricing regime. Or equivalently, for the local
markets x ∈ [0, x̂e], entry occurs earlier when a uniform price constraint is imposed
while for markets in [̂xe, x¯], entry occurs later, with x̂e formally defined as Y∗(̂xe) =
Ŷ = YUP∗(̂xe). Figure 2 illustrates that.
We can intuitively explain this result as follows. Uniform pricing leads to higher
prices in contested markets and thus higher profits for the entrant. Contemplating
the possibility of higher profits, the entrant has incentives to enter local markets
earlier. However, as the market coverage increases competition becomes fiercer in the
contested markets and the entrant has strategic incentives to delay entry in a new
local market.11
When market coverage is limited, the higher profit effect dominates the strate-
gic effect and entry occurs earlier under the uniform price regime. But, as the entrant
expands its network, the benefit of covering an additional market decreases ((xe) is
11 This strategic effect of the uniform price on the coverage decision has been pointed out
by Valletti et al. (2002) in a static context.
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Table 3 – Impact of the uniform price constraint
1Market (x < x̂e) (x > x̂e)





decreasing) and the entrant will slow down its network expansion. At some point (̂xe),
the strategic effect countervails the higher profit effects and the network expansion
will be slower under the uniform pricing regime despite a higher profit in each
covered local market. Hence, the uniform price constraint accelerates entry in the
local markets with a low connection cost but it slows it down for the high connection
cost markets.
Including a geographically uniform tariff in the universal service implies price
distortions that reduce overall efficiency. The efficiency cost of the uniform tariff must
be balanced against its redistributive benefit and a welfare evaluation must trade-off
these two dimensions, efficiency and equity (Cremer et al. 2001). In this paper, we
show that, in a dynamic perspective, uniform pricing creates an additional distortion
by modifying the timing of entry in local sub-markets, an effect that must be taken
into account in any welfare analysis.
In our dynamic framework, each market x will pass through three phases: a
pre-entry period characterized by the fact that no entry take place at x whatever the
pricing regime, a transition period when entry at x occurs under one pricing regime
but not under the other and a post-entry period when entry occurs whatever the
pricing regime. As in a static context, the imposition of a uniform price leads to higher
prices if the market is challenged by the entrant (during the post-entry period) and
a lower price if it is not (in the pre-entry period). Prices at x during the transition
period are either higher or lower depending on the localization of x.
For markets in [0, x̂e], the transition period is characterized by entry under the
uniform pricing regime but no entry under the unconstrained regime.12 For these
local markets, prices are lower during the transition period when a uniform price
constraint is imposed (pUP∗k < p
m∗
i ). The opposite is true for markets in [̂xe, x¯]. During
the transition period, entry occurs only in the unconstrained pricing regime and prices
are thus higher (p∗k < p
UP∗
k ). Table 3 summarizes the impact of the uniform tariff
on the prices in the three periods (pre-entry, transition, post-entry). Beyond these
qualitative effects, a complete welfare comparison should take into account not only
the difference in prices and surplus in the three periods but also the (expected) length
of these periods. Such an analysis is obviously difficult and beyond the scope of this
paper. From our qualitative analysis, it appears that no consumer unambiguously
benefits from the imposition of a uniform price constraint.
12 Formally, this transition period corresponds to realizations of Y(t) ∈ [YUP∗, Y∗].
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7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that the imposition of a uniform price constraint
is not neutral with respect to the timing of entry by a competing firm. In particular,
uniform pricing by the incumbent accelerates entry in the urban markets but it delays
entry in the rural ones. In this view, whether a uniform price constraint should be
maintained in the long run in a liberalized market is a debatable question. We show
that, when the demand is sufficiently mature, the negative effects of uniform pricing
(higher prices in the contested markets, delays in entry) are likely to outweigh the
benefits (lower prices in the non-covered markets). Consequently, the uniform price
should be only transitory in a liberalized market.
Currently, the development of an alternative postal network remains hypothet-
ical in many countries. Postal markets are now fully liberalized in Europe but e-
substitution has increased dramatically the uncertainty surrounding the future of the
industry. This paper contributes to the debate by highlighting the factors that drive
entry and network expansion by alternative postal firms. Importantly, we show that
network expansion does not depend only on the local market characteristics13 but also
on the demand uncertainty and the pricing policy adopted by the incumbent universal
service provider. Increased uncertainty and greater price flexibility are likely to delay
the development of alternative postal networks. If competition develops further, it
would be interesting to compare the path of network expansion of alternative postal
firms and, in particular, to study the influence of the pricing constraints included in
the universal service on the extent and the speed of network deployment.





Consider first the unconstrained price regime. We follow the procedure of an
incremental investment problem (See Dixit and Pindyck 1994: 357–377 ). Let us
denote the maximized value function (the Bellman equation) of firm e when its
coverage is xe and the state of demand is Y by W(xe, Y). Suppose that firm e expands
its coverage from xe to x′e when the number of consumers changes from Y to Y + dY.




















First of all, we need to check whether the Bellman equation is concave in xe.






e and suppose the
optimal investment policy leads to {xae} and {xbe} from these initial market coverage,
respectively. Then, firm e’s net profit flow at Y(t) (i.e., the profit flow minus the













dt = [Y (t) xae πe(p∗i , p∗e ) − G (xae )]dt,
13 See d’Alcantara and Gautier (2008) and Gautier and Paolini (2011) for a static analysis
of entry in postal markets with different geographical characteristics.
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where G(xae ) ≡
∫ xae
0 g(ξ )dξ . Similarly, the net profit flow at Y(t) under the optimal













dt = [Y (t) xbe πe(p∗i , p∗e ) − G (xbe )]dt.
Define xθe ≡ θxae + (1 − θ ) xbe where θ ∈ (0, 1). Here, we notice that G(xe) ≡
∫ xe
0 g(ξ )dξ




)− G (xae )− (xbe − xae )G′ (xae ) = ∫ xbe
xae








dξ − (xbe − xae ) g (xae ) = 0.
Hence, θG(xae ) + (1 − θ ) G(xbe ) > G(xθe ). Then, we have the following:[



















dt + (1 − θ ) [Y (t) xbe πe(p∗i , p∗e ) − G (xbe )]dt.








)+ (1 − θ )W (xbe , Y) ,
which states that W(xe, Y) is concave in xe.
Then, the following first-order condition is necessary and sufficient for the
maximization with respect to x′e of (7).
e−rdt{E[Wx(x′e, Y + dY)] − g(x′e)} = 0. (8)
As dt → 0, (8) can be written as
Wx(x′e, Y) = g(x′e), (9)
which is exactly the threshold function. In the following, we characterize it by
developing the standard argument.
Consider the region in which firm e does not change its behaviour (i.e., no
incremental investment). That is, x′e = xe. Substituting x′e = xe into (7), we have









dt + e−rdt {E [W (xe, Y + dY)]} (10)
Using Ito’s lemma for the expansion of the right-hand side of (10), we have








e )dx − rW (xe, Y) + αYWY (xe, Y) +
1
2
σ 2Y2WYY (xe, Y)
]
dt.
Hence, we obtain the following differential equation.
1
2





e )dx = 0
From the boundary condition at Y = 0, its general solution is represented by








r − α , (11)
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Notice that the constant of integration B in (11) depends on xe: B(xe). Then B(xe) and
the threshold value Y are simultaneously determined by the following value-matching
and smooth-pasting conditions:




e ) = g (xe) . (12)




e ) = 0 (13)
Hence, from (12) and (13), we obtain the threshold function Y∗(xe) and the associated
constant term B(xe).
Y∗ (xe) = β
β − 1
r − α
πe(p∗i , p∗e )
























The procedure to derive the threshold function YUP
∗
(xe) is exactly the same,




e (xe). The concavity of
xeπUP
∗
e (xe) in xe is sufficient for the concavity of the Bellman equation. Notice that the
concavity of xeπUP
∗
e (xe) in xe is equivalent to the supposition of Proposition 3 (i.e., (xe)
≡ πUP∗e (xe) + xedπUP∗e /dxe is decreasing in xe).
Appendix B: Proof of proposition 3
First of all, we can ensure that πUP
∗
e (xe) is monotonically decreasing in xe. In




















decreasing in xe. Hence we have πUP
∗
e (xe) ≥ π e(p∗i , p∗e) for any xe ∈ [0, x]. (The equality
holds at xe = x.)
Next, consider (xe). Evaluating it at xe = 0, we have  (0) > π e(p∗i , p∗e). Sim-
ilarly, evaluating it at xe = x, we have (x) < πe(p∗i , p∗e ) because πUP∗e (x) = πe(p∗i , p∗e ).
Therefore, as long as (xe) is monotonically decreasing in xe, there exists a threshold
x̂e such that  (̂xe) = πe(p∗i , p∗e ). Since both Y∗ (xe) and YUP∗ (xe) are monotonically
increasing in xe, we can ensure that there exists a threshold Ŷ such that Y∗(̂xe) =
YUP∗(̂xe) ≡ Ŷ.
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Couverture progressive des marche´s et obligations de service universel
Les obligations de service universel peuvent modifier la nature de la concurrence
que se font les entreprises sur un marche´. Dans cet article, nous conside´rons un
continuum de marche´s locaux dans un environnement dynamique ou` la demande
croıˆt de manie`re stochastique. L’entreprise installe´e doit servir tous les marche´s locaux
(ubiquite´ du service) et, e´ventuellement, a` un prix identique. Une entreprise concurrente
de´cide elle de sa couverture des marche´s avant que les entreprises ne se fassent
de la concurrence en prix. La couverture d’un marche´ local implique un couˆt de
connexion non re´cupe´rable. Nous montrons que l’imposition d’une contrainte de service
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universel a` l’entreprise installe´e modifie le comportement d’entre´e du concurrent: les
marche´s pour lesquels les couˆts de connexion sont faibles sont servis plus rapidement,
tandis que pour les marche´s ou` le couˆt de connexion est e´leve´, l’entre´e a lieu plus
tardivement.
Graduelle Netzexpansion und Universaldienstverpflichtungen
Universaldienstverpflichtungen sind gewo¨hnlich wettbewerblich nicht neutral, da sie
die Art und Weise, in der die Unternehmen miteinander auf dem Markt konkurrieren,
modifizieren. In diesem Beitrag betrachten wir ein Kontinuum lokaler Ma¨rkte in einem
dynamischen Umfeld mit stochastisch wachsender Nachfrage. Der etablierte Betreiber
muss mo¨glicherweise alle Ma¨rkte zu einem Einheitspreis bedienen (Ubiquita¨t), und ein
neu in den Markt Eintretender entscheidet fu¨r sich u¨ber seine Marktabdeckung, bevor
die Unternehmen im Preiswettbewerb konkurrieren. In ein Marktsegment einzutreten,
involviert versunkene Kosten. Wir zeigen, dass die Auferlegung eines Einheitspreises
das Timing des Markteintritts modifiziert: In Marktsegmenten mit niedrigen Ein-
trittskosten erfolgt der Markteintritt fru¨her, wa¨hrend er in Marktsegmenten mit hohen
Eintrittskosten spa¨ter erfolgt.
Cobertura progresiva de los mercados y obligaciones de servicio universal
Las obligaciones de servicio universal pueden modificar la naturaleza de la compe-
tencia que se hacen las empresas en el mercado. En este artı´culo se consideran una
sucesio´n de mercados locales en un entorno dina´mico donde la demanda crece de
manera estoca´stica. La empresa instalada debe servir a todos los mercados locales
(ubicuidad del servicio) y, eventualmente, a ide´ntico precio. Cualquier empresa puede
decidir dotarse de cobertura en el mercado ante la posible competencia en precios
de las restantes. La cobertura de un mercado local implica un coste de conexio´n no
recuperable. En el artı´culo se muestra que la imposicio´n de una obligacio´n de servicio
universal a las empresas instaladas modifica el comportamiento de entrada de las
competidoras: los mercados en los que los costes de conexio´n son de´biles se atienden
ma´s ra´pidamente, mientras que en los mercados donde los costes de conexio´n son
elevados la entrada tiene lugar ma´s tardı´amente.
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